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ABSTRACT 
CONRAD JOSEPH COLLINS: The Metaphysics of Transubstantiation: The Problem of 
Individuality in the Seventeenth Century 
(Under the direction of Timothy Yenter) 
The purpose of this thesis is to look at the recurring question of the relationship 
between theology and philosophy by investigating the 17th century debate on the 
Eucharist as it revolved around Descartes and Leibniz. The Jesuit explanation of 
transubstantiation involves the philosophical problem of individuation, which asks what 
makes an individual substance what it is. Therefore, the study focuses specifically on the 
problem of individuation as it is treated by the philosophers Descartes and Leibniz as 
they try to answer the previous question. Descartes’s mechanical philosophy runs against 
the notion of what constitutes a body, while Leibniz’s monadology finds an obstacle in 
explaining a change of substance. The evidence of these attempts suggests that what 
transubstantiation implies can be demonstrated only within a proper metaphysics. Thus, 
the question shows that certain theological commitments have specific metaphysical 
consequences and vice versa. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1563 the Council of Trent, one of the Catholic Church’s most important 
ecumenical councils, came to a close and promulgated its decrees. As a response to the 
Protestant Reformation that took place earlier in the 16th century, the council was 
convened to clarify the Church’s doctrines and teachings and condemn teachings 
promoted by Protestantism. The Catholic Church responded to a common Protestant view 
that the Eucharist was not substantially the body of Christ by restating and more fully 
defining the doctrine of transubstantiation, which is the way in which the Catholic 
Church explains how Christ comes to be present in the bread and wine. 
The Council’s decree gave three parts to the Catholic Church’s explanation of the 
sacrament of the Eucharist. The first is the claim that Jesus Christ is present body, blood, 
soul and divinity in the Eucharist. This presence Catholics call the Real Presence. Second 
is how he is present. The Church states that he is present under the species of sensible 
things and that he is sacramentally present to us in his own substance. Of these first two 
matter, the Council decreed, “In the first place, the holy Synod teaches, and openly and 
simply professes, that, in the august sacrament of the holy Eucharist, after the 
consecration of the bread and wine, our Lord Jesus Christ, true God and man, is truly, 
really, and substantially contained under the species of those sensible things” (Council of 
Trent 76). As the decree states, the real presence of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist must be
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declared first, because the foundation of the Catholic belief in the Eucharist is that Jesus 
Christ is substantially present in his body. Transubstantiation need not occur if this is not 
the case. 
Yet, because this is the position the Church promotes, the decree involves a third 
part, which describes the way in which Christ becomes present: 
Because Christ our Redeemer said that it was truly his body that he was offering 
under the species of bread, it has always been the conviction of the Church of 
God, and this holy Council now declares again, that by the consecration of the 
bread and wine there takes place a change of the whole substance of the bread 
into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord and of the whole substance of 
the wine into the substance of his blood. This change the holy Catholic Church 
has fittingly and properly called transubstantiation (Council of Trent 78). 
The Council of Trent’s decision to restate and define the doctrine of transubstantiation 
effectively committed the Catholic Church to a certain metaphysical stance that used the 
language of Aristotle, using words such as “species,” which means appearances, and 
“substantially” (substantiae). The use of Aristotelian terms in the Council’s decree on the 
Eucharist comes from a revival of scholasticism and the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. 
This revival in the 16th century, as Cyril Vollert states in his introduction to Francisco 
Suarez’s “On the Various Kinds of Distinctions,” was primarily theological, but brought 
with it “a philosophical restoration, characterized by a return to the thirteenth century, 
above all to the thought of St. Thomas” (2). It is expressed in the decrees of the Council 
of Trent, which used the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas alongside the Bible, but it was 
spearheaded by the Jesuits, the members of the Society of Jesus.  
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Despite this resurgence of Thomistic thought in the 16th century, Christian 
philosophy was shifting away from Aristotle by the 17th century. The Protestant 
Reformation had not been stymied by the work of the Jesuits, and the Church was 
fighting what it considered yet another theological threat in the form of Jansenism. The 
Jansenists emphasized predestination and the necessity of divine grace, and saw 
themselves as followers of St. Augustine’s teachings. As such, their teachings resembled 
some common Protestant teachings and they were also opposed to the Jesuits.  
In addition to the theological threat, the successes of the so called “new science” 
were disproving more and more of Aristotle’s physics and hurting his metaphysics. 
Simply put, Aristotle’s physics and metaphysics were becoming obsolete. As Roger 
Ariew put it in Descartes and the Last Scholastics, “one of the more important changes in 
seventeenth-century philosophy is the movement from what is variously called 
Scholasticism, naturalism, or animism to what is variously called the mechanical 
philosophy, corpuscularism, or atomism” (123). Disappointed with Aristotelian thought, 
the philosophers of the time—figures such as Descartes and Leibniz—turned elsewhere 
for inspiration. 
What in Aristotelian scholasticism disappointed these new philosophers? The 
problem of individuation related directly to the struggles that Aristotelianism faced with 
the Eucharist. Individuation is the metaphysical term to express what makes a thing itself 
and not something else. “The struggle with individuation was, for medieval thinkers, a 
struggle to make good on the Aristotelian project of articulating the structure of 
substance, supplementing and refining Aristotle’s own account in response to perceived 
explanatory demands of various metaphysical and theological concerns” (Cover 12). For 
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the follower of Aristotle, discussions of individuation always involved form, matter and 
accident. Generally, either form or matter, or both together were used to settle the 
problem of individuation (Cover 12). The Jesuits scholastics generally sided with St. 
Thomas and Aristotle that matter was the principle of individuation, but other schools of 
thought, which opposed this position, were gaining momentum in the 17th century. 
Some matters of theology come with certain philosophical commitments, and 
especially certain metaphysical commitments. It is for this reason that Roger Ariew says, 
“it was the common practice of Catholic philosophers when they were theorizing about 
natural philosophy to discuss the compatibility of their physical theories with such 
mysteries of the Catholic faith as the sacrament of the Eucharist” (147). He is speaking 
about the philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries. Catholic intellectuals commonly 
believed that metaphysics was intimately connected to theology. Suarez, a Jesuit at that 
time, stated in one of his Metaphysical Disputations that “[metaphysics] has for its object 
the most universal and supreme principles which embrace all being and are the 
foundation of all knowledge” (“Distinctions” 6). The doctrine of transubstantiation 
practically embodies this notion; it is a metaphysical description of one of the most 
important theological tenets of Catholicism. 
This paper will look at three approaches to the problem of transubstantiation. The 
first will be the so called “orthodox” position defended by the Jesuits, which was used as 
the basis of criticism against novel philosophical theories. The second is Descartes’ 
approach through his substance dualism and anti-Aristotelian philosophy. The third is the 
reconciliatory approach of Leibniz. Descartes and Leibniz were both influenced by Jesuit 
scholastics but were instrumental in turning early modern philosophy away from 
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Aristotle. A problem for these two philosophers was to explain adequately the real 
presence of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist in a way that was philosophically free from 
Aristotelian notions of substance, yet still retained what is essential to the notion of 
transubstantiation, mainly, that a change of substance occurred without the change of 
appearances. The Jesuits saw it as their responsibility to determine whether philosophers 
like Descartes and Leibniz had accomplished this. 
Thus, we begin with the Jesuit understanding of transubstantiation and their 
subsequent criticism of the philosophies of Descartes and Leibniz. The Jesuits involved 
in this study were not simply trying to condemn Descartes and Leibniz. They were, 
rather, looking for a better philosophy than the scholastic philosophy they had. These 
Jesuits wanted Descartes and Leibniz to succeed in giving an orthodox philosophical 
theory, and so were challenging those points which were seemingly in conflict with the 
teachings of the Church. So, the Jesuit positions will lead us into the solutions Descartes 
and Leibniz provide. 
The first of these two that I will look at is Descartes, who studied at the Jesuit 
college at La Fleche. Descartes’s explanation of transubstantiation in strongly connected 
to his decision to denote the mind, or soul, as the substantial form and principle of 
individuation in his metaphysics. Subsequently, Descartes and his followers were heavily 
criticized for their explanations of the Eucharist. Indeed, this seems “to have been the 
focus of opposition to Cartesianism” (Ariew 142). The criticism, however, came 
primarily from within Descartes’s own network of correspondents and followers. This 
‘Cartesian network’ was made up of close correspondents who wanted Descartes’ 
mechanical philosophy to succeed, but who also wanted to remain orthodox. The purpose 
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of these criticisms was to urge Descartes to demonstrate how a Catholic could accept his 
philosophy while remaining faithful to the teachings of the Catholic Church. For this 
reason, the chapter on Descartes will begin by analyzing the first of Descartes’s attempts 
to defend the compatibility of his philosophy with transubstantiation.  
The initial defense comes from the “Fourth Set of Objections and Replies,” where 
the Jansenist Antoine Arnauld expresses reservations on account of the difficulties 
Descartes’s metaphysics pose to a Catholic account of transubstantiation. This sets the 
foundation of Descartes’s demonstration of transubstantiation according to his 
metaphysics, which is addressed more fully through the correspondence Descartes held 
with several Jesuits and Catholic theologians. Through these various sources, I will piece 
together a coherent picture of Descartes’s view of transubstantiation that can be evaluated 
against the three parts of the Catholic Church’s explanation of the Eucharist. Thus, I will 
have provided an explanation of transubstantiation according to a philosophy expressly 
opposed to the Aristotelian philosophy from which the doctrine of transubstantiation 
emerged. 
Having established Descartes’s position on the Eucharist, I will turn to 
Descartes’s description of the mind as a revival of Augustine’s own description. Using 
Descartes and Augustine by Stephen Menn and The Augustinian Tradition by Gareth 
Matthews, I will establish Descartes’s concept of the soul and of bodies as rooted in 
Augustine and opposed to Aristotelianism. This will be viewed primarily as Descartes’s 
answer to the reforming theologians of his time who wished “to free the faith” from 
Aristotelianism yet still retain the immortality of the soul (Menn 52). Descartes’s answer 
provides a “new approach to philosophy” that begins with the insensible soul and moves 
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to the nature of bodies as its end (Menn 52). Having established the Augustinian tradition 
in Descartes, I will have demonstrated how this conflict within the Cartesian network 
over the nature of the Eucharist embodies the emerging conflict over the relation of faith 
and reason. 
Less radically minded than Descartes is the Lutheran philosopher Gottfried 
Leibniz. It was generally the desire to do philosophy without Aristotle that drove 
Descartes to explain transubstantiation in a way that did not use Aristotelian thought, but 
for Leibniz, retaining some of Aristotelian philosophy was an important part of his 
reconciliatory method. Leibniz preferred to take what was reasonable in various 
philosophies rather than completely reject entire philosophical systems. In his early 
career, Leibniz was very much tilted toward scholastic philosophy. This early attachment 
remained with Leibniz even as his philosophy matured, because of his larger program of 
bringing all the divisions of Christianity back together. His reconciliatory attitude and the 
Aristotelian influence, however, did not protect Leibniz from criticism on account of 
transubstantiation. 
The problem Leibniz’s metaphysics posed to transubstantiation revolved around 
the nature of substances and the existence of substantial forms in his philosophy, much in 
the same line as Descartes. Leibniz’s monadology made mental entities the most real, and 
all bodies became mere phenomena. The emphasis on mental entities appears to be a 
radical take on Augustine’s own approach to the relation between minds and God. 
Leibniz’s view arises from a Neoplatonic conception of “divine causation” that makes 
God the “source” of His creatures’ perfection (Fouke 47). Therefore, our analysis of 
Leibniz will begin with his own explanation of transubstantiation and of corporeal 
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substances in his correspondence with the Jesuit Bartholomew Des Bosses, whereby he 
introduces the notion of the substantial bond, or vinculum substantiale, and then move to 
elucidating his theory of monads, which forms the foundation of his later metaphysics. 
The introduction of the substantial bond comes in the part of the correspondence 
where Des Bosses and Leibniz begin to discuss the apparent incompatibility of his 
metaphysics with transubstantiation. The problem was very much connected to the 
problem of individuation and so involved his controversial Identity of Indiscernibles, but 
much of his motivation for explaining transubstantiation with his metaphysics seems to 
have come from his reconciliatory attitude. Fouke writes that Leibniz’s first attempts “to 
demonstrate the possibility of transubstantiation” were part of his efforts to “reunify the 
churches” (46). Indeed, early in his career, Leibniz began the Catholic Demonstrations, 
which were meant to cover a variety of theological topics, one of which was 
“demonstrate the essential agreement of Catholic and Protestant doctrines of the 
Eucharist” (Loemker 167). Leibniz, as a Lutheran, does not believe in transubstantiation 
(Look lviii). So, the question Des Bosses is pressing on Leibniz is whether a Catholic can 
affirm transubstantiation “while accepting Leibniz’s theory of monads” (Look lviii). 
Answering this question involves analyzing Leibniz’s response in light of the three parts 
of the Church’s explanation of the Eucharist, then studying Leibniz’s metaphysical 
program in relation to his approach to religious reconciliation. This will demonstrate an 
approach to the problem of transubstantiation from the perspective a separating faith and 
reason. 
Having laid out two philosophical explanations of transubstantiation that depart 
from the traditionally Scholastic explanation, I will conclude with comparing the 
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approaches of each theory. For Jesuits, the goal is retaining the original understanding of 
transubstantiation as it is expressed by the decrees of the Council of Trent. For Descartes, 
the approach involves an Augustinian, rather than Thomistic, Catholic perspective. For 
Leibniz, his approach involves disconnecting philosophy from faith, and so making the 
goal simply avoiding logical contradiction. Despite these differences in approach, each 
philosopher had to tackle the problem of individuation in explaining the Eucharist. 
Thus, the common philosophical theme that is carried throughout this work is 
how the problem of individuation is treated by each philosopher, and how each argument 
shaped, or was shaped by, the problem of transubstantiation. Thus, we find in the debate 
over the Eucharist an effort to accept the discoveries of the new science while also 
maintaining orthodox beliefs, which showed itself in the dynamic that brought together 
the new thinking of Descartes and Leibniz and the traditional thinking of the Jesuits. 
Through these different approaches to the problem of transubstantiation, I expect to 
provide thought provoking philosophical explanations of the real presence of Jesus Christ 
in the Eucharist that retain what transubstantiation implies.
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CHAPTER I: THE INFLUENTIAL INQUIRIES OF THE JESUITS 
As was mentioned in the introduction, the philosophical movement of the 16th 
century was spearheaded by the newly established Society of Jesus, which was founded 
by St. Ignatius to combat the spread of Protestantism. St. Ignatius advised his fellow 
Jesuits, as they called themselves, to follow the theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 
which required accepting his philosophy, which in turn required following Aristotle. So, 
the Jesuits generally veered toward Thomism. Still, they were free to follow their own 
philosophical speculations since “the Society had no direct roots in the medieval 
tradition” and had no ties to St. Thomas Aquinas (Suarez 2). Thus, it was not a steadfast 
rule and many Jesuits were not afraid to disagree with the authority of St. Thomas 
Aquinas. 
Much of the discussions over the Eucharist during the 17th century involved the 
“tension between maintaining solidity and uniformity in doctrine while negotiating 
different natural philosophical traditions and coming to terms with contemporary 
developments” (Hellyer 548). The Jesuits came to represent this tradition, and so this 
chapter will focus on the Jesuits as defenders of the traditional understanding of the 
decrees of the Council of Trent. It is important to note that their main agenda was to 
protect the validity of the sacrament of the Eucharist. Since they felt unconstrained by the 
traditional scholasticism, they were free to dialogue with mechanical philosophers such 
as Descartes. This most likely was the result of the philosophical climate of the time, 
which was separating the realms of philosophy and theology.  
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Despite this philosophical freedom, the Jesuits still preferred to hold on to the 
Aristotelian scholasticism of St. Thomas Aquinas until they felt a better philosophical 
system was proposed. Some argue that, for the Jesuits, one could not simply criticize 
Aristotle. “If some new philosophy were to replace Aristotle’s, it would have to be at 
least as systematic and scientific, at least as compatible with Christianity, at least as 
practically productive for empirical research and for morality” (Menn 24). This is how 
the Jesuits who were in correspondence with Descartes and Leibniz approached new 
philosophies. As a result, the dialogues with Descartes and Leibniz referenced in this 
work should be viewed as productive criticism. These Jesuits were constantly challenging 
these philosophers to work out any perceived flaws or conflicts with the faith. 
There are two groups of Jesuits important to this study. On one hand were Jesuits 
like Francisco Suarez, who established the kind of thought the Jesuit contemporaries of 
Descartes and Leibniz followed. Suarez and other Jesuits were also a great influence on 
both Descartes and Leibniz themselves. Suarez, in particular, wrote extensively on the 
problem of individuation, which was large in medieval philosophy and continued to 
persist into the early modern period. He is also especially important because of his 
Disputatio Metaphysicae, which some consider to be “the most carefully worked-out 
system of metaphysics” of any Catholic philosopher (Vollert 4). These Jesuits give 
understanding to the positions of Descartes, Leibniz and the Jesuits they were in 
correspondence with. Therefore, it is important to look at some of their approaches to the 
problem of individuation. 
On the other hand, there are the Jesuits who were in contact with Leibniz and 
Descartes. These were figures like Bartholomew des Bosses and Denis Mesland, who 
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were able to throw their weight into the philosophical debates of the time and press the 
discussions on the Eucharist through these exchanges. The important determining factor 
in this search was whether the philosophical theory was compatible with existing 
theological doctrines. Hellyer captures the conflict when he writes, “A theological 
doctrine was, in effect, determining whether a physical doctrine was acceptable” (Hellyer 
547). Thus, the problem for the Jesuits is apparent. The theological doctrines they were 
defending were infused with Aristotelian language, but they were looking for 
philosophies that resolved the problems that Aristotelian philosophy faced. So, the 
question arises for philosophers of whether they needed to drop Aristotle completely or 
work to figure out what could be retained and what could be lost. 
To this effect, this chapter will first examine the Jesuits who engaged in the 
discussions on the Eucharist with Descartes and Leibniz, and particularly Bartholomew 
Des Bosses and Denis Mesland, in order to understand from what perspective these 
Jesuits were approaching the issue. Then it will conclude with a look at Francisco Suarez, 
a Jesuit who preceded Descartes and Leibniz and who influenced both philosophers. The 
primary purpose of this structure is to extract the problem of individuation that is inherent 
to the problem of the Eucharist. Through this, we will be able to more adequately 
understand the reactions of Descartes and Leibniz when we look at them individually. 
Des Bosses, in a characteristically Jesuit manner, works with Leibniz to reconcile 
his theories with the orthodox teachings of the church. To this effect, he presents his own 
explanation of transubstantiation using Leibniz’s theory of monads (Des Bosses, 
Correspondence 175). He begins by stating that the Catholic position is that both the 
form and the matter of the bread and wine are destroyed. For Des Bosses, this would 
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seem to mean that the monads of wheat must be destroyed, but that contradicts Leibniz’s 
position that monads cannot be destroyed. So, Des Bosses argues that, since monads do 
not make up the mass, these monads can be removed and replaced by the monads of the 
body of Christ, as long as the monads of Christ’s body are “deprived of their extension, 
which is not essential to them” (Correspondence 175). In this way, Des Bosses believes, 
the act of transubstantiation can be adequately explained. In doing so, he maintains that 
the substance of Christ is determined by the monads of the body of Christ rather than a 
single monad. 
In my research, I was unable to find either Mesland or Mersenne’s letters to 
Descartes that prompted his explanations of the Eucharist. Yet, by analyzing Descartes’s 
letters, I was able to put together a picture of their views. The primary letter from 
Descartes to Mesland is dated 9 February 1645, wherein Descartes provides a detailed 
explanation of the Eucharist “useful for avoiding the slander of heretics” (3: 242). This 
explanation completely relies on the principle of individuation being the human soul, 
rather than the union of matter and form. In Descartes’s following letter it is obvious that 
Mesland was not satisfied with this explanation, because Descartes clarifies that there is 
no need to accept the explanation, but repeats that he thinks it is useful against heretics 
who claim the teachings of the Church are unreasonable.  
The letters to Mersenne, which come earlier, demonstrate that the two Jesuits 
shared a concern for Descartes’s philosophy on account of transubstantiation. Father 
Marin Mersenne was an ordained priest and intellectual supporter of figures such as 
Descartes, but was also a defender of Aristotle against their new philosophies. For 
Mersenne, simple criticism of Aristotle was not enough. That Mersenne found Descartes’ 
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philosophy wanting did not mean that he would condemn it, but that he would remain 
with Aristotle for the time being but continue to encourage Descartes in becoming “the 
new Christian Aristotle” (Menn 24). This seems to be the mentality of the Jesuits with 
whom Descartes was in correspondence. Descartes’s responses in these letters are 
primarily directed at answering this call by showing that his explanation does better than 
the scholastic explanation. Unfortunately, we do not know for certain whether Mesland 
and Mersenne were convinced by his explanations, but the available letters from 
Descartes suggest they were not. From Descartes’s repeated need to explain the 
compatibility of his views, it seems that the two Jesuits continued to follow the traditional 
scholastic understanding of transubstantiation. 
While these contemporaries of Descartes and Leibniz were instrumental in 
shaping Descartes and Leibniz’s thoughts according to theological traditions, and 
provided the catalysts for their explanations of the Eucharist, the most influential Jesuit 
for Descartes and Leibniz was Francisco Suarez. As was stated previously, his 
metaphysical system is the most carefully worked out system of any Catholic 
philosopher. Furthermore, Suarez sits on the brink of the shift from scholastic philosophy 
to mechanical philosophy. He is firmly planted in the scholastic tradition, but he does not 
feel bound to follow his predecessors in his approach to philosophy. Some argue that 
Suarez held the understanding that philosophy and theology occupied “independent 
spheres of operation” and had different methods and concerns (Gracia 478). For problems 
of philosophy, then, he tries to give purely philosophical arguments. And it is those 
arguments that I look at next in determining the traditional understanding of individuation 
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amongst Jesuits that provides the philosophical background within which Descartes and 
Leibniz were working. 
Suarez takes the position that unity “does not add anything positive” to being (qtd. 
Gracia 480). He maintains that there is a distinction between unity and being, but that “it 
is not a distinction in which the notion of unity includes something that the notion of 
being does not” (Gracia 480). On the face of it, this does not make very much sense, but 
this confusion can be resolved by Suarez’s theory on distinctions.  
For Suarez, there are three kinds of distinctions. The first is a real distinction, 
whereby a negation “distinguishes between positive, real things, one of which is not the 
other” (Suarez, “Distinctions” 17). The second is a mental distinction which only 
intervenes between “things designated as distinct…as they exist in our ideas” (Suarez, 
“Distinctions” 18). The third is a modal distinction. Of the modal distinction Suarez 
states,  
“I think it is true without qualification that there is among created things a certain 
actual distinction which is found in nature prior to any activity of the mind, and 
that such distinction is not so great as the distinction between two altogether 
separate things or entities” (“Distinctions” 27). 
Suarez believes that unity is distinguished from being “not only because it is one of its 
attributes, but because the name [‘one’ and ‘being’] are not synonyms, and to them 
correspond diverse formal and objective concepts in the mind” (qtd. Gracia 480). 
Therefore, distinction between unity and being would fall under mental distinctions, and 
so would not be really distinct. 
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 This distinction leads to the conclusion that unity, in reality, is an “attribute of 
being,” (Gracia 483). Furthermore, it is that attribute which prevents an entity from being 
divided “into many similar entities such as itself” (qtd. Gracia 484). Thus, unity is that 
which gives individuality. In other words, the principle of individuality is the whole 
entity, and so, as Gracia says, “being is convertible with individual being” (483). This 
understanding of individuality, which argues that “everything insofar as it exists is 
individual,” reflects the Aristotelian scholastic formula (486). Every entity is individual: 
matter, substantial form, etc. Considering this principle, we understand the standard 
scholastic explanation of the Eucharist to maintain that accidents have individual unity 
from the substances they inhere in. Being metaphysically distinct, they can logically exist 
apart from their original substance. Yet, because of their nature, they do not give identity 
to a substance. Rather, the union of matter and form do. This is the explanation which 
Descartes and Leibniz contend with in choosing to attribute the principle of individuation 
to something other than simply being. 
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CHAPTER II: THE REBELLIOUS REASONING OF DESCARTES  
Descartes believed that the explanation of transubstantiation that used Aristotelian 
metaphysics was inadequate and hurt the validity of the sacrament. So, for the sake of 
maintaining the rationality of Christianity, Descartes found that it was necessary to find a 
better metaphysics. His metaphysics was the cause of a great deal of criticism, but Ariew 
notes the irony that most of the criticism of Descartes were previously used against 
Aristotelianism in the thirteenth century (144). Descartes’s solution to the problem of 
transubstantiation is best elucidated in one of his letters to the Mesland. He argues that, at 
the words of consecration, the soul of Jesus Christ informs the particles of bread and 
wine. Since, all matter, “which as a whole is informed by the same human soul,” is 
considered to be an entire human body, the bread and wine wholly and individually are 
made to be the body and blood of Jesus Christ when his soul informs them (Descartes, 3: 
233-4). Descartes reaches this conclusion by completely turning around the principle of 
individuation as it was understood by the scholastics. Following St. Thomas, most 
scholastics saw matter as the principle of individuation, but Descartes declares that it is 
the soul which serves this function. 
This chapter will first look at Descartes’s defense of transubstantiation with his 
own theories in response to Antoine Arnauld’s objections and in correspondence with the 
Jesuits Mersenne and Mesland. Then, I will evaluate his explanation according to the 
three parts of the Church’s decree on the Eucharist. This look at Descartes’s explanation 
of transubstantiation will reveal his view on the problem of individuation, which will lead
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to a consideration of how equating the human soul with substantial form determines his 
view of individuation, noting particularly that the nature of the soul in Descartes’s 
metaphysic borrows heavily from the philosophical tradition of St. Augustine. Then, I 
will conclude with my observation of how Descartes's own beliefs affect his approach to 
the blurred lines between metaphysics and theology. 
In his earliest references to the Eucharist, Descartes claims that transubstantiation 
can easily be explained using his philosophy, but avoids elucidating how this is done. The 
first reference Descartes makes to transubstantiation in his preserved letters is found in a 
letter addressed to Vatier in 1638. In this letter, Descartes is apparently addressing the 
recipient’s previous concerns that his philosophy contains ideas contrary to the faith. 
Descartes believes that his philosophy more strongly supports the Catholic faith. He 
writes, “Transubstantiation, in particular, which the Calvinists regard as impossible to 
explain by the ordinary philosophy, is very easily explained by mine” (Descartes, 3: 88). 
Yet, Descartes refrains from addressing how this is done. Instead, he writes that he sees 
no obligation to do so for the time being (3: 88). Again, in a letter to Mersenne, which is 
dated in January of 1641, he writes that transubstantiation “is very clear and easy to 
explain” on his principles (Descartes, 3: 172). He does not, however, address the issue 
any further in this letter.  
Finally, in letter to Mersenne dated three months after the previous one, Descartes 
mentions that he is sending his replies to Arnauld’s objections (3: 177). In the same letter, 
Descartes is markedly bolder in his stance on transubstantiation. He writes the following 
to Mersenne: 
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You will see that in it I reconcile that doctrine of the Councils about the Blessed 
Sacrament with my own philosophy - so much so that I maintain that it is 
impossible to give a satisfactory explanation of the doctrine by means of the 
traditional philosophy. Indeed, I think that the latter would have been rejected as 
clashing with the Faith if mine had been known first. I swear to you in all 
seriousness that I believe it is as I say. So I have decided not to keep silent on this 
matter, and to fight with their own weapons the people who confound Aristotle 
with the Bible and abuse the authority of the Church in order to vent their 
passions - I mean the people who had Galileo condemned (Descartes, 3: 177). 
In this excerpt, it is obvious that Descartes has decided to pit his philosophy against the 
Aristotelian tradition. Furthermore, this is also the letter with which Descartes sends his 
replies to Arnauld. Therefore, to see how Descartes addresses the apparent conflict of his 
metaphysic with the doctrine of transubstantiation, we must start with his response to 
Arnauld. 
In the “Objections,” Arnauld voices the problem that Descartes faces. Catholics 
believe that the substance of the bread is taken away, with only the accidents remaining. 
Descartes does not think there are such things as sensible qualities, or accidents, to use 
the language of the Scholastics, only “various motions in the bodies that surround us” 
(Descartes, 2: 153). The motions enable us to perceive certain impressions that we call 
qualities. Only shape, extension and mobility remain and actually inhere in a substance, 
and they cannot exist without that substance. Indeed, Descartes identifies the substance of 
body with extension. Furthermore, there is no distinction between the substance and its 
different states (Descartes, 2: 153). So, Descartes is challenged to explain a change of 
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substance that is not accompanied by a change in appearance. To answer this challenge, 
Descartes ultimately appeals to a metaphysical entity that exists beyond the metaphysical 
entity of matter, the substantial form, but this answer comes later in his correspondence 
with Mesland. Therefore, I begin by looking at Descartes’s reply to Arnauld. 
The first part of Descartes’s reply is simply a response to a technicality: he never 
explicitly denied the existence of accidents (Descartes, 2: 173). He distinguishes between 
not having knowledge of them, and supposing they do not exist, using the program of the 
Meditations as a way to avoid the criticism. Satisfied with this explanation, he states that 
God can separate modes from the substance they inhere in. So, he qualifies his position to 
mean that the modes cannot naturally be separated from their substance in order to avoid 
denying the omnipotence of God (Descartes, 2: 173). Following these qualification is 
perhaps the most important point of Descartes’ reply. The concept he chooses to adhere 
to in this instance is the problem of perception. He maintains that our senses only 
perceive the surface of things, and that this surface is neither part of the substance nor of 
the surrounding bodies, but rather “the boundary that is conceived to be common to the 
individual particles and the bodies that surround them; and this boundary has absolutely 
no reality except a modal one” (Descartes, 2: 174). To bring the point back to the matter 
of the Eucharist, the problem is that “the new substance must affect all our senses in 
exactly the same way as that in which the bread and wine would be affecting them if no 
transubstantiation had occurred” (Descartes, 2: 175). That is the role of the boundaries, 
which Descartes explores further in his letters to Mesland. 
In two letters to the Jesuit Mesland, Descartes discusses ‘surfaces’ where he 
mentions the Eucharist. In the first, he distinguishes bodies from their surfaces as “a 
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substance from its modes” (Descartes, 3: 235). For the outward shape of the bread to 
remain in the Eucharist, at least one mode belonging to the bread must remain within it. 
That mode must be the ‘surface’ of the bread (Descartes, 3: 235). Continuing this 
discussion in the next letter, Descartes clarifies his concept of surfaces, which he defines 
as that which sits between an object and the air surrounding it. The surface is a mode of 
being, “which cannot be changed without a change in that in which or through which it 
exists” (Descartes, 3: 241). The importance for the matter of the Eucharist is that the 
surface of the bread and the surface of the air touching the bread are, in reality, a single 
thing. As Descartes says, “For if the body of Jesus Christ is put in the place of the bread, 
and other air comes in place of that which surrounded the bread, the surface which is 
between that air and the body of Jesus Christ is still numerically the same as that which 
was previously between the other air and the bread” (3: 242). This is because the 
numerical identity of the surface “does not depend on the identity of the bodies between 
which it exists, but only on the identity or similarity of the dimensions” (Descartes, 3: 
242). Having elucidated this point, Descartes then provides an explanation of 
transubstantiation. 
When talking about the body of a man Descartes feels it is necessary to clarify 
what he means by ‘body’. There are two ways in which to talk about bodies. In one sense, 
it is simply a “determinate part of matter,” but when speaking of the body of a man we 
mean something else (Descartes, 3: 242). The traditional philosophy of Descartes’ time 
says that man is conceived as body and soul. The contemporary of Descartes recognizes 
that dead and living people have something in common, a body. Therefore, in 
recognizing that there is an evident difference between a dead body and a living person, 
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the philosopher supposes that a living person has a soul and dead people do not. 
Furthermore, the philosopher must conclude, this soul is responsible for the acts of the 
living person’s body (Menn 250). The body of the man is all the matter attached to that 
man’s soul.  It is for this reason that we can say, after the matter changes or the body 
increases or decreases in size, that it is the same body as long as it is united with that 
particular soul (Descartes, 3: 243). 
Descartes next point builds directly into his theory of what happens in the 
Eucharist. When one eats bread or wine, the particles which make it up are dissolved into 
our bodies in a form of natural transubstantiation. They are the same particles, yet they 
are now part of the human body, united with the soul (Descartes, 3: 243). This is a natural 
transubstantiation, where the body incorporates the particles which were once considered 
particles of bread or of wine into itself. The miracle of transubstantiation in the Eucharist 
is that the soul of Jesus Christ informs the particles of the bread and wine “simply by the 
power of the words of consecration” (consecration is the action of declaring bread and 
wine to be the body and blood of Christ) as opposed to Jesus consuming them (Descartes, 
3: 243). Since it is the soul which gives identity, Descartes concludes, one can easily see 
how the body of Christ can be wholly present once in the undivided host and also “whole 
and entire” in each of its parts, because “all the matter, however large or small, which as 
a whole is informed by the same human soul is taken for a whole and entire human body” 
(3: 244). With this explanation, Descartes maintains the supernatural aspect of 
transubstantiation, while also retaining the physics of his philosophy, but he also offends 
the traditional understanding of transubstantiation. 
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Ariew writes, “there is no doubt that both aspects of Descartes’s explanations of 
the Eucharist are in conflict with Thomist explanations” (152). Yet, I believe that his 
second explanation adequately captures what transubstantiation entails. The Thomist 
explanation equates numerical identity with matter, and the explanation of the Eucharist 
refers “not only to specific metaphysical and physical theories about substance, 
substantial forms, accidents or modes, and extension and quantity, but also to place and 
to the principles of individuation” (Ariew 152). This does not make sense within a 
philosophy that accepts atoms or something akin to them, such as Descartes’ mechanical 
philosophy. With philosophy working to accommodate the new science, the previous way 
of thinking needed to be replaced. Thus, Descartes writes in a later letter to Mesland, “the 
numerical identity of the body of a man does not depend upon its matter, but on its form, 
which is the soul” (3: 278). Associating numerical identity with form was not a novel 
concept. The Scotists (followers of Duns Scotus), in opposition to Thomists (followers of 
Thomas Aquinas), who held the previously common view, held the position that form 
was the principle of individuation (Ariew 85). 
This solution might have been given more consideration if Descartes’ 
metaphysics had no other points of contention. Indeed, it was the radical dualism of 
Cartesian metaphysics that put other philosophers in doubt over his philosophy. Descartes 
was facing the same “Scotist-type” problem of the unity of mind and body in the human 
being (Ariew 56). Progress in the sciences, however, was giving support to his physics 
that was born from this metaphysics. So, critics had to ask where the soul resided in the 
body so that it could influence and be influenced by it. Eustachius gave multiple opinions 
on the topic, citing the church fathers claiming it to be in the heart, the Platonists 
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claiming it to be in the brain, and Aristotle in holding that it informs the body in all its 
parts (84). Descartes’ explanation of transubstantiation seems to align with Aristotle’s 
view on this point, but in the Sixth Meditation, Descartes observes that the mind is only 
really affected by a small part of the brain, the pineal gland (2: 59). 
Putting the validity of Descartes’ metaphysics aside, we will evaluate his 
explanation of transubstantiation according to the three parts of the Catholic Church’s 
understanding of the Real Presence of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist. The first claim is that 
Jesus is present body, blood, soul and divinity in the Eucharist. Descartes’ explanation 
claims that when Christ’s soul informs the bread and wine, that they become his body. 
Bread and wine particles are incorporated into our bodies whenever we consume them. 
This is only a natural transubstantiation, whereas the presence of Jesus Christ in the 
Eucharist is a supernatural transubstantiation. The power of God makes this supernatural 
transubstantiation occur. Therefore, Descartes can confidently say that the body, blood, 
soul and divinity of Jesus are all accounted for according to his theory.  
The second claim is that Jesus is present under the species of sensible things so 
that he is sacramentally present to us in his own substance. According to Descartes, the 
particles of bread and wine are made to be part of Jesus Christ’s body. Sensible things, 
according to Descartes, are the result of motion, which is found in matter. That the bread 
and wine particles remain, albeit substantiated into Christ’s body, allows for Jesus to be 
present under the species of these sensible things. Again, it seems that Descartes’s theory 
holds up.  
The final claim is that the whole substance of the bread and the whole substance 
of the wine are changed into the substance of the body and blood of Christ. Here, 
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Descartes is faced with difficulty. His theory claims that the particles of bread and wine 
are not actually destroyed. Yet, the traditional understanding of this passage was that the 
substance of the bread and the substance of the wine are destroyed and replaced by the 
substance of the body of Christ. The purpose for this was to avoid the confusion with the 
theory of consubstantiation, which states that both the substance of the bread and the 
substance of Christ’s body are present. The Catholic Church is adamant in its stance that 
the bread is no longer bread after the words of consecration, so Descartes’s theory 
received backlash, but in reality his theory seems to do no harm. 
Yet, Descartes was working at a time when the intellectual world was generally 
dissatisfied with Aristotle, and much of Christianity was falling back to the theology and 
philosophy of Augustine. Menn describes the present tension when he states, 
“Aristotelian philosophy began with sensible things, and encountered the soul only at the 
end of its journey, as the last and most obscure question of physics: it is not surprising 
that the answers it gave were not always in accord with Christian faith” (54). Indeed, the 
problem of the Christian philosopher working with Aristotle was reconciling the ancient 
philosopher’s ideas with those of Christian theology. Descartes’s philosophical program 
intersects the expectation of the Counter-Reformation for a Christian philosophy “based 
integrally on Augustine and without appeal to Aristotle” (Menn 44). It is no coincidence, 
then, that Descartes found an audience with Jansenists such as Antoine Arnauld. The 
Jansenist movement was deeply rooted in Augustinian views of the nature of free will 
and grace. 
According to Menn, Descartes “was answering the call of the Catholic reformers 
to take up Augustine’s method of reflection on soul and God, and to make it the basis for 
26 
 
thought” (44). But how does this embrace of Augustinian thought show itself in 
Descartes’ interpretation of transubstantiation? Augustine, in the Confessions, attributes 
the principle of individuation to form, rather than matter (307). The terms ‘form’ and 
‘matter’ were used to denote the two foundations of substances in scholastic philosophy. 
Descartes almost completely rejected forms, except in allowing that the human soul be 
the form of a human being. This allows Descartes to claim in his letter to Mesland, that 
the soul of Jesus Christ, upon informing the matter of the host, makes the bread his body 
(3: 243) 
That Descartes determines the soul to be the form of the human person thus 
reflects Augustine’s influence. Some have even argued that Descartes “anchors his whole 
philosophy where Augustine does, proceeding to draw the consequences of what 
Augustine too regarded as the starting-point of our knowledge of God and the world” 
(Menn 5). And, as Matthews points out, contemporaries of Descartes like Mersenne and 
Arnauld “all pointed to a similarity between Descartes’s cogito and reasoning…that can 
be found in Augustine” (222). This similarity is Descartes’s method in the Meditations, 
which begins with knowledge of the soul, moves to knowledge of God, and only then 
proceeds to knowledge of the world. This is significant because, as Emily Grosholz 
writes, “the objects of knowledge that Descartes puts first in the order of reasons are all 
individuals” (44). An individual knows herself first, then God, then extended things. This 
is basically the reverse of the method of the Aristotelian philosophers, who began with 
sensible things and moved upward to God.  
Before even discussing extended objects in the Sixth Meditation, Descartes 
demonstrates in the Second Meditation that the first thing we can know exists is our soul, 
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“as conceived purely intellectually,” and in the third Meditation that the first thing we 
come to know outside of the soul is God, “as conceived purely intellectually” (Menn 
246). Thus, Grosholz can say, “the two entities that Descartes claims to know first in the 
order of reasons are individuals: the self and God” (52). The second meditation suggests 
that human individuality consists in the human soul. Yet, Descartes’ radical doubt forces 
him to reconsider the individuality of other things. To do this, he must first move to 
knowledge of God. It is in perceiving God “purely intellectually” that Descartes is able to 
move from the knowledge of the soul to knowledge of God. Both the soul and God are 
known as purely intellectual. This, however, is only a starting point. For Descartes, and 
all Christians, God is so much more than pure intellect. Descartes, then, must prove that 
God is the creator of both spiritual and extended things. For this purpose, Descartes 
introduces the deceiving God.  
As Menn states, “When we confront the possibility of an omnipotent deceiving 
God, we are forced to recognize that God is involved in knowledge, at least negatively, as 
a possible obstacle to knowledge” (238). Thus, the meditator is forced to conclude that 
we do not possess within ourselves the power of knowledge, which the soul can only 
receive from an appropriate source, “the God of popular belief” (Menn 238). Once the 
Meditator is forced to accept that God is at least involved in knowledge, Descartes can 
work to demonstrate “not just that God is non-deceptive or even benevolent, but also that 
he has whatever power is needed to produce a creature capable of knowledge” (Menn 
242). To provide His creatures with the perfection of knowledge, God himself must hold 
the perfection of knowledge. Descartes believes he is able to infer all other divine 
attributes from this principle that God knows everything, and so he adopts the scholastic 
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interpretation of omniscience, which states that for God to know everything outside of 
Himself, He must have willed it to be (Menn 289). Thus, Descartes concludes that God 
must be the creator of all things outside of Himself by virtue of being omniscient, and 
therefore is the creator both spiritual and extended objects. 
This is where Descartes presents his theory of dualism, which receives a great 
deal of backlash for many reasons, one of which being the problem raised by Antoine 
Arnauld in the “Fourth Set of Objections.” Arnauld says that what will most likely give 
the greatest offence to the Church “is that according to the author’s doctrines it seems 
that the Church’s teaching concerning the sacred mysteries of the Eucharist cannot 
remain completely intact” (Descartes, 2: 153). Yet Descartes’s theory of 
transubstantiation literally has the substance of the bread and the substance of the wine 
change into the body and blood of Jesus Christ. He can do this because he does not 
attribute individuation to matter. Substance is something more basic than matter and 
substantial forms inform matter. It is for this reason that Descartes believes his theory is 
of better use to the Church than the theories of the scholastics. Furthermore, when viewed 
in comparison to the three aspects of the Church’s explanation of the Eucharist, 
Descartes’ theory of transubstantiation is actually promising, especially when also 
considering modern discoveries in the realm of physics, such as the atom and subatomic 
particles. Attributing identity to physical entities causes all sorts of problems involving 
parts, and wholes, and parts of wholes. By keeping substance firmly rooted in the 
metaphysical realm of nonphysical being, Descartes preserves the unity of physically 
composite organisms. Following suit, we see Leibniz remove physical entities even 
further from his theory of metaphysics and explanation of transubstantiation. 
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CHAPTER III: THE APPEASEMENT APPROACH OF LEIBNIZ 
 When looking at Leibniz’s treatment of the Eucharist and the doctrine of 
transubstantiation, it is important to note the difference between early Leibniz’s 
philosophy and the philosophy of the later Leibniz, because early Leibniz “was very 
much immersed in a scholastic approach to [substances]” (Cover 19). This can easily be 
seen in his 1668 work, On Transubstantiation, which provides the first example of 
Leibniz’s attempts to make sense of transubstantiation as well as insight into how 
scholastic philosophy looked in the 17th century. Mature Leibniz moves away from this 
thinking and, in his later years, proposes the theory of monads that he commits himself to 
for the rest of his life. While his approach to the Eucharist may have shifted as he 
matured, McCullough argues that “when it comes to individuals and their individuation,” 
Leibniz remains within the framework of the scholastic tradition (204). Thus, his early 
approach to the Eucharist remains relevant to our study. 
That being said, while I begin by looking at early Leibniz’s understanding of 
transubstantiation in order to garner a better understanding of his later views, I maintain 
that Leibniz’s explanation of transubstantiation according to his mature philosophy is the 
primary subject of this chapter. I will compare this theory to his later explanation of 
transubstantiation as it is expounded through his correspondence with the Jesuit 
Bartholomew Des Bosses. As in the chapter on Descartes, I will then evaluate is theory in 
light of the three parts of the Council of Trent’s decree on the Eucharist, and relate the 
problem of transubstantiation in Leibniz to the broader philosophical problem of 
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individuation through his theory of monads. Thus, I will conclude with my observation of 
how Leibniz’s beliefs, and particularly his Protestantism, determines his understanding of 
the relationship between theology and philosophy in the example of the sacrament of the 
Eucharist. 
The method of philosophical reasoning in Leibniz’s On Transubstantiation is very 
reminiscent of St. Thomas and the Jesuit scholastics in that he presents the explanation, 
then gives commentary on it (Leibniz, Papers 178). In the essay, he hopes to demonstrate 
the scholastic position that the substance of the bread and the substance of the wine are 
destroyed and replaced by the substance of Christ body with “only their appearance or 
accidents remaining,” and that Christ is present wherever “the appearance of consecrated 
bread and wine exists” (Leibniz, Papers 178). For Leibniz, this requires clearly defining 
the meanings of the terms “substances, appearances or accidents, and numerical 
identity” as the Scholastics understood them (Leibniz, Papers 178). These premises 
capture Leibniz’s understanding of transubstantiation at this point. A human body is a 
substance insofar as it is united with the human mind. When this union with a concurring 
mind changed in a body, it can be said to have been transubstantiated. “Hence bread and 
wine as bodies, when the concurrent mind is changed, are substantiated into the body of 
Christ, or taken up by Christ” (Leibniz, Papers 170). The significant point is that Leibniz 
attributes particular substance to union with a mind. In the case of the human body, this 
would mean union with the soul, which was believed to have mental processes. The 
connection of particular substances to minds relates closely to his later theory of monads, 
which will play a larger role in his discussions of the Eucharist. 
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Leibniz follows this claim to the necessary conclusion that a body “appropriated 
by the mind of Christ” must be numerically the same as “the body of Christ who suffered 
for us,” thus making either the consecrated bread or the consecrated wine a “numerically 
identical substance as the body of Christ” (Leibniz, Papers 180). Since nothing has 
changed except the “concurrent mind” which is united with the body, all accidents are 
preserved in the consecrated bread and wine (Leibniz, Papers 180). Finally, since minds 
are not in a place themselves, but act upon bodies which are in space, “the mind of Christ 
can be present everywhere in the species of consecrated bread and wine” (Leibniz, 
Papers 181). In defining transubstantiation as a change of substantial form, Leibniz has 
demonstrated “numerical identity of substance from the numerical identity of substantial 
form” and made substantial form the principle of individuation (Leibniz, Papers 182). 
So, having attributed individuation to form rather than matter, Leibniz expresses the same 
influence that impacted Descartes. Still, Leibniz retains much of the scholastic tradition 
in using the same language and terms. 
The mature Leibniz took a different approach to the problem of transubstantiation. 
And more specifically, the Leibniz who corresponds with Des Bosses is tackling the 
problem that corporeal substances pose to his theory of monads and simple substances. 
Des Bosses initiated their discussion on the Eucharist by urging Leibniz to explain the 
Real Presence of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist. For Des Bosses, it was important for being 
able to understand how extension can come about through Leibniz’s monads 
(Correspondence 149). To answer this challenge, Leibniz reaches for two possibilities: 
“either bodies are mere phenomena, and so extension also will be only a phenomenon, 
and monads alone will be real, but with a union supplied by the operation of the 
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perceiving soul on the phenomenon,” or we accept the existence of corporeal substances, 
and that they consist in some unifying reality, “which adds something absolute (and 
therefore substantial), albeit impermanent, to the things to be unified” (Leibniz, 
Correspondence 227). Transubstantiation, Leibniz says, must involve a change of that 
something, “for monads are not really ingredients of this added thing, but requisites, 
although they are required for it not by an absolute and metaphysical necessity, but only 
by exigency” (Leibniz, Correspondence 227). By this reasoning, when the substance is 
changed the monads will remain, because monads are not part of the substance of the 
body.  
In his explanation, Leibniz is attempting to relate the accidents in the Eucharist to 
phenomena. The corporeal substance is above monads. By this explanation, the body is 
not truly a substance but only a phenomenon we perceive. Indeed, Leibniz states in a 
supplement to the same letter that if “bodies are phenomena, and are judged by our 
appearances, they will not be real, since they will appear differently to others” 
(Correspondence 231). He prefers that explanation to the introduction of some unifying 
reality, but Des Bosses does not accept that bodies are mere phenomena, and so must 
regard the unifying reality as something true. Leibniz is convinced that this thing must be 
a substance, but Des Bosses argues that it is an accident, in that it cannot exist without 
monads, and so is ‘accidental’ to them (Correspondence 237). There must be something 
more than mere phenomena for the theology of the Eucharist to make sense. Since 
Leibniz equates accidents with phenomena, he recognizes that this superadded thing must 
be a substance, because monads alone “do not constitute a complete substance” 
(Correspondence 243). 
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It takes several more letters before Leibniz proposes an explanation of 
transubstantiation using the idea of a substantial bond. The monads are retained, but God 
adds “the substantial bond of the body of Christ” while the previous substantial bond is 
destroyed, in order to substantially unite the “monads of the bread and wine” (Leibniz, 
Correspondence 273). It is the phenomena of the bread and wine monads which remain. 
The monads are not the principle of individuation for bodies. As Leibniz says, “we do not 
designate monads by either “this” or “body” (for how many have thought of them?), but 
the substantiated thing arising or composed through substantial bonds” (Correspondence 
273). Thus, to explain “the substantial change of transubstantiation,” Leibniz introduces 
the vinculum substantiale, or substantial bond, as the unifying principle in corporeal 
substances (Cover 51). 
Leibniz’s substantial bond “was to enjoy many of the properties Leibniz reserved 
for substances: it was to explain metaphysical unity...to have the status of a substantial 
form, and to consist in the primitive active power from which all actions of a substance 
arise” (Cover 51). The qualities of the substantial bond are the same as those which 
Leibniz would attribute to the principle of individuation. Hence, he can say that there 
only needs to occur “the destruction and substitution of the thing that formally constitutes 
composite substance,” thus allowing the monads, which cause the phenomena, to remain 
(Cover 275). With this explanation, the substantial bond would seem to provide an 
account of transubstantiation but for the fact that it seems to only be introduced to 
appease Des Bosses’s requests for an explanation of transubstantiation.  
The vinculum substantiale is often used to charge Leibniz with insincerity as a 
philosopher. Leibniz did not believe in transubstantiation himself, and the vinculum is 
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inconsistent with Leibniz’s “picture of a world containing only simple substances” 
(Cover 51). Yet, discussions of the vinculum and transubstantiation were a significant 
part of the correspondence between Leibniz and Des Bosses, and the idea of the 
substantial bond was something the later Leibniz became fixated on explaining. That it 
first arises during a discussion of the Real Presence of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist 
should not disqualify it from being considered genuine philosophy. Rather, it allows one 
to understand how Leibniz treated the distinction between philosophy and theology.  
With the introduction of the vinculum substantiale into his theory of monads, 
Leibniz believes he has provided a way in which a Catholic can accept his metaphysics 
and still hold the Church’s teaching on transubstantiation. Leibniz does not accept either 
corporeal substances or transubstantiation as true (Look lxiii). He is only working to 
show how a Catholic might build off his monadology in order to understand certain 
matters of faith. That Leibniz clearly draws a line between philosophy and theology says 
a great deal about his program. The theory of monads is purely a philosophical theory 
that, in Leibniz’s eyes, “best accounts for the phenomena in a way consistent with the 
requirements of perfection, or divine wisdom” (Look lxi). Any religious claim must go 
beyond the theory of monads, which is supposed to be neutral on matters of dispute 
within Christianity, only having the constraint “that any miracles appealed to must be 
consistent with the theory of monads” (Look lxi). This is the difficulty with Leibniz’s 
position. He cannot completely separate metaphysics and theology, because they 
ultimately have consequences for one another. 
Leibniz’s theory of monads questions the reality of matter in physical objects. A 
large part of Catholic belief emphasizes the reality of the material world, and it is for this 
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reason that Des Bosses has reservations “about the metaphysical adequacy of the theory 
of monads” (Look lxv). Leibniz supports the premise that bodies are mere phenomena, 
and the introduction of vinculum substantiale and corporeal substances does not actually 
change the nature of bodies in Leibniz’s monadology. Bodies in a corporeal substance are 
only realized phenomena (Leibniz, Correspondence 297). The phenomenological view of 
bodies is what puts Leibniz’s theory in contention with the Catholic Church’s teaching on 
the Eucharist. Having said this, I will evaluate his theory against the claims of the 
Church. 
Again, the first claim is that Jesus is present body, blood, soul and divinity in the 
Eucharist. Leibniz’s theory is already at risk with this first claim. To begin, Jesus Christ’s 
body and blood are considered phenomena under Leibniz’s theory. Then, the substantial 
bond of the body of Christ is added to the monads of the bread and wine. These monads 
remain monads of bread and wine, but they are unified by a different substantial bond, 
that of the body of Christ. Leibniz makes no mention of the presence of Christ’s soul and 
divinity, but we can assume that they are somehow present in the substantial bond. 
Leibniz’s concern is more of the physical side of the metaphysical problem and less on 
the supernatural end. Yet, the monads of Christ are not present, and so one must wonder 
whether Christ is fully and substantially there. 
So, we come to the second claim, which is that Jesus is present under the species 
of sensible things so that he is sacramentally present to us in his own substance. The 
preservation of the monads of the bread and wine explain how Jesus is present under the 
species of bread and wine, because the monads provide the phenomena. Assuming that 
the reality of substance is determined by the substantial bond, we must agree with 
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Leibniz that Jesus is present in his own substance if the substantial bond of his body has 
replaced the previous substantial bond. Des Bosses's reservations about the vinculum 
being a substance are well founded, especially since Leibniz’s theory of monads does not 
require them. Accepting or rejecting the reality of corporeal substances determines what 
is considered substantial, and Leibniz seems to sway on the side of all thing being 
phenomena. 
The final claim is that the whole substance of the bread and the whole substance 
of the wine are changed into the substance of the body and blood of Christ. There cannot 
be substantial change if there are no substances, and Leibniz only considers monads to be 
substances, not bodies. Therefore, the reality of corporeal substances must be accepted to 
even consider the act of transubstantiation. By Leibniz’s explanation, the monads of 
bread and wine remain, but their substantial bonds are destroyed and replaced by the 
substantial bond of the body of Christ. If the monads are part of the whole substance of 
the bread and the whole substance of the wine, they must be replaced during 
transubstantiation as well, but Leibniz is adamant that they remain, because they provide 
the phenomena. The difficulty in reconciling Leibniz’s theory of monads with 
transubstantiation should be apparent. It is difficult to speak of the change taking place 
within a philosophy that rejects many common accounts of what change is. 
As such, Leibniz’s position is tenuous. It is made even more precarious by the fact 
that (1) he does not himself believe in the reality of transubstantiation, and (2) his answer 
requires the reality of something that he is not fully ready to admit to. His program is 
very much one of proposing “what if’s.” If transubstantiation is true, then corporeal 
substances must be posited. If corporeal substances are true, then the vinculum 
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substantiale must be posited. If the vinculum is true, then we are left with a confusing 
understanding of the monads that contradicts Leibniz’s own emphasis on simple 
substances. Thus, his exploration of the matter with Des Bosses looks more like a thought 
experiment. Yet, it is still a fruitful correspondence, because it demonstrates that Leibniz 
considers the substantial bond to be the principle of individuation of corporeal 
substances. 
The problem of individuation played a prominent role in much of his 
metaphysical thinking throughout his career. Leibniz tries to tackle the problem of 
individuation in one of his earlier papers, “First Truths,” where he sets the stage for his 
program by stating that no two things in nature can have only a numerical difference 
(Leibniz, Papers 413). This follows from his premises that an individual substance 
contains all of its past, present and future predicates within itself, and that each individual 
substance “involves the whole universe in its perfect concept” (Leibniz, Papers 414). 
Leibniz also proposes a theory of harmony, where, through God’s creation and 
ordination, everything that happens to the body “corresponds perfectly and 
automatically” to everything that happens to the soul. At this point, Leibniz brings in the 
problem of corporeal substances, which are confusing within his theory of monads, for 
they must exist in some sort of union added to the monads (Cover 51). No corporeal 
substance, Leibniz says, can be without some incorporeal component. If there was 
“nothing but extension, or magnitude, figure, and their variations” in a corporeal 
substance, then two corporeal substances could exist that were perfectly similar to each 
other, and since that is impossible, it follows that there is something “analogous to the 
soul” in corporeal substances, which would be similar to a substantial form (Leibniz, 
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Papers 416). Thus, all of these points build into the idea that bodies do not individuate 
substances, but some unifier is the principle of individuation.  
The idea that this substantial bond is the principle of individuation comes from 
the concept of a substance as a thing in itself. The principle of individuation cannot be 
something attached to a substance, otherwise it could be shared amongst substances, 
making it something that is not the principle of individuation. “It is absolutely 
fundamental to Leibniz’s thinking on individuation that whatever individuates a 
substance must be something wholly internal to that substance itself” (Cover 28). The 
difficulty with corporeal substances in Leibniz’s metaphysics is that in order to exist, 
there must be some unifying reality over and above the monads. Thus, that unifying 
principle must be the substance, and therefore the principle of individuation as well. 
Removing the distinction between substance and the principle of individuation is 
a foundational part of Leibniz’s metaphysics. For Leibniz, “there is something about 
individuals themselves that makes them individual” (McCullough 203). This something 
must account for and individual’s unity and distinction from other individuals and cannot 
be merely a quality of the individual. Basically, Leibniz is arguing that “each individual 
is its own principle of individuation” (McCullough 206). This is hinted at by his 
statement in De Transubstantione, where he states, “Substance is being which subsists in 
itself” (Papers 178). Thus, Leibniz’s view on individuals reflects the scholastic view that 
“everything insofar as it exists is individual” (Gracia 486). At the same time, however, he 
rejects the division of substance into matter and form, and takes up the theory of monads 
in its place. Having redrawn the lines of division, Leibniz is left with substantial bonds as 
his solution to corporeal substances. 
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The place of substantial bonds in the metaphysics of Leibniz is a strange one, but 
it makes sense in a philosophy that makes the principle of individuation the whole entity. 
In corporeal substances, there are parts that are being brought together. None of these 
parts can in themselves be the principle of individuation, and so the unifier that brings 
and holds the parts together must necessarily be the principle of individuation. Since the 
real presence of Jesus Christ in the Eucharist requires at least that corporeal substances 
exist, Leibniz is required to provide this explanation whether he accepts 
transubstantiation or not. Thus, a theological doctrine is still affecting the metaphysics of 
this philosopher by forcing the creation of an entirely new entity to deal with the problem 
of individuation. 
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CHAPTER IV: BRINGING THREE INTO ONE CONCLUSION 
 In the introduction, I set the stage for the problem at hand and gave an account of 
the doctrine that spurred the discussion, that of transubstantiation. In the following 
chapters, I followed the concept of individuality as three different methods of philosophy 
treated it within the problem of transubstantiation. These three philosophies were 
defended by the Jesuits, Descartes and Leibniz. The Jesuits provided the standard 
Catholic position on the Eucharist as it was passed down from the Council of Trent. This 
is the position against which Descartes and Leibniz were compared in determining the 
compatibility of their metaphysics with the sacrament of the Eucharist. It is clear from 
these observations that, for these philosophers, transubstantiation requires that the 
individuality of substances involves something other than what affects our senses. It must 
be something more real than mere phenomena. Indeed, a philosophy that wishes to 
remain true to transubstantiation can neither be completely materialistic, nor be total 
idealism, for the decree on the Eucharist clearly states that a substantial change occurs 
that cannot be perceived through the senses. We have already evaluated how Descartes 
and Leibniz’s theories held up to this doctrine, but how their theories compare to one 
another is a matter I now conclude with. 
 Descartes and Leibniz represent two different ways in which to approach 
philosophy. On one hand was Descartes, who wanted to replace scholastic philosophy. 
On the other hand was Leibniz, who took a more reconciliatory approach. Descartes more 
boldly left behind the traditional understanding of substances by adopting the position of 
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substantial dualism, while Leibniz retained a great deal of scholastic thought. Yet, despite 
these philosophical approaches, Descartes was a professed Catholic and Leibniz a 
professed Lutheran. They treated the line between metaphysics and theology very 
differently. Hence why Descartes’s Meditations reflects the thought of St. Augustine, 
while Leibniz must add an entirely new concept that was not previously a part of his 
philosophy to explain a theological decree. Descartes accepted the blurred lines between 
metaphysics and theology, but Leibniz thought that philosophy and theology occupied 
separate realms. Thus, their philosophical programs as well as their own religious beliefs 
impacted their theories on the Eucharist. 
Despite these differences, Descartes and Leibniz are not completely different 
from each another and share a common view on individuality. This is obvious in the 
similarities between Leibniz’s vinculum substantiale and Descartes’s substantial form. In 
both instances, they are the principle of individuation for bodies, they are superadded to 
whatever reality is already present, and they do not have any extension in space. Both 
ideas are used in the explanation of corporeal substances, which are made of immaterial 
and immaterial. In both cases, the bond and the soul do not destroy the pre-existing 
components of the corporeal substance. So, unifying theme appears between these two 
philosophers, which says that individuality is associated with the unity within substances. 
Thus, Descartes and Leibniz reflect the position of Suarez, who held that substance itself 
is the principle of individuation, because individuality requires unity. Thus, Descartes and 
Leibniz’s metaphysical approaches demonstrate, at the same time, the consequences that 
theology has for metaphysics and the consequences that a certain metaphysic can have 
for theology.
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